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ABSTRACT 
In early 2012, Congolese army deserters formed the M23 rebel movement. This article analyses the 
insurgency and other armed group activity in the eastern DRC in the light of the politics of rebel-
military integration. It argues that military integration processes have fuelled militarization in three 
main ways. First, by creating incentive structures promoting army desertion and insurgent violence; 
second, by fuelling inter- and intra-community conflicts; and third, by the further unmaking of an 
already unmade army. We argue that this is not merely the product of a ‘lack of political will’ on behalf 
of the DRC government, but must be understood in the light of the intricacies of Big Man politics and 
Kinshasa’s weak grip over both the fragmented political-military landscape in the east and its own 
coercive arm. Demonstrating the link between military integration and militarization, the article 
concludes that these problems arise from the context and implementation of integration, rather than 
from the principle of military power-sharing itself. It thus highlights the crucial agency of political–
military entrepreneurs, as shaped by national-level policies, in the production of ‘local violence’. 
 
 
IN THE SPRING OF  2012, THE PROTRACTED VIOLENCE in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) flared up again with the launch of yet 
another major rebellion, soon known as M23. The group was formed after the 
desertion of an important faction of the former rebel group Congrès National pour la 
Défense du Peuple (CNDP, National Congress for the Defence of the People), who 
had integrated overnight into the Congolese military after a peace accord with the 
government, formally signed on 23 March 2009. Taking their name from this accord, 
the group claims that the Congolese government has failed to live up to its terms.1 In 
various offensives from April onwards, the M23 quickly occupied substantial parts of 
Rutshuru territory in North Kivu, revealing once more the operational weaknesses of 
the military from which they had defected.  
As with other armed groups operating in the east, there are several underlying 
causes of the M23 rebellion. Conflict dynamics in the DRC are multilayered and 
armed group formation is driven by such variegated factors as inter- and intra-
community conflicts around political, economic, and military influence; power 
disputes at and with the national centre; the general nature of the state, governance, 
and the political economy in the DRC2; and, importantly, regional power politics.3 																																																								1	M23, ‘Qu’en est-il des accords de paix du 23 mars 2009 et des nouvelles revendications du M23?’, 
M23 official website, 9 August 2012, <http://www.m23mars.org/quen-est-ildes-accords-de-paix-du-23-
mars-2009-et-des-nouvelles-revendications-du m23.html/> (21 August 2012). 2	Jean-ClaudeWillame, Banyarwanda et Banyamulenge: Violences ethniques et gestion de l’identitaire 
au Kivu (Institut Africain-CEDAF and L’Harmattan, Brussels and Paris, 1997); Paul Mathieu and Jean-
Claude Willame (eds), Conflits et guerres au Kivu et dans la région des Grands Lacs: Entre tensions 
locales et escalade régionale (Institut Africain-CEDAF and L’Harmattan,Tervuren and Paris, 1999); 
Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers (eds), Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR 
Congo (Academia Press Scientific Publishers, Ghent, 2004). 3	Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and regional geopolitics, 1996–2006 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2009); Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan 
genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe (Oxford University Press,Oxford, 2009). 
However, as we argue in this article, there is another factor underlying armed group 
mobilization that has so far received limited scholarly attention: the politics of rebel-
military integration. 
Political power-sharing agreements have become an almost standard 
ingredient of negotiated settlements to civil wars in Africa, as elsewhere.4  A growing 
number of these agreements contain clauses on military power sharing.5 Often under 
strong pressure from international stakeholders, several countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as South Africa, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and the DRC, have embarked 
upon the seemingly adventurous path of merging former competing military forces 
into a single national army.6 While most of these countries closed the doors to the 
army after the integration of the signatories to the final peace agreement,7  the DRC 
government has opted for a continued open-doors policy. This has had profound 
adverse implications for conflict dynamics in the eastern DRC. In fact, seen from the 
angle of the politics of military integration, the M23 rebellion did not come as a 
surprise. 
The apparent failure of rebel– military integration in the DRC raises a number 
of questions. Most importantly, why and how has the chosen military integration path 
affected conflict dynamics negatively? And why did the DRC government continue to 
pursue this path, despite indications of its limited effectiveness in terms of reducing 
violence? Drawing on 13 months of ethnographic research in and around military and 
rebel deployment sites in the Kivus and interviews with over 260 military staff in 
various parts of the country, this article demonstrates how the politics of military 
integration has become a crucial factor in sustaining violence in the eastern DRC. By 
creating incentives for insurgent mobilization, undermining the cohesion and 
perceived neutrality of the army, and fuelling communal conflict, it has fostered 
rather than diminished militarization. Both rebel groups with a more pronounced 
regional dimension, like the M23, and those more rooted in local tensions, such as 
groups of Mai–Mai, must ultimately also be understood in relation to the wider 
politics of military integration. We argue that this politics of integration is not merely 
the product of the government’ s lack of will to address army reform and violence in 
the east. Rather, it must also be seen in the light of Kinshasa’ s weak grip over both 
the fragmented political-military landscape in the east and its own coercive apparatus. 
The article proceeds as follows: first, we provide an historical overview of military 
integration processes in the DRC, highlighting three distinct phases. Second, we 
analyse the implications of these processes for conflict dynamics in the east, focusing 
on three aspects: the creation of incentive structures promoting army desertion and 
insurgent violence; the fuelling of inter-and intra-community conflicts; and the further 
unmaking of an unmade army. Finally, we focus on the role of the DRC government, 
exploring the motives, logics, and consequences of the politics of serial rebel– 
military integration. 																																																								4	Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, ‘The hidden costs of power-sharing: reproducing insurgent 
violence in Africa’, African Affairs 104, 416 (2005), pp. 375–98. 5	According to Glassmyer and Sambanis, rebel–military integration has been used in a third of the 
peace processes since 1990. Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Rebel–military integration 
and civil war termination’, Journal of Peace Research 45, 3 (2008), pp. 365–84. 6 Stephen Burgess, ‘Fashioning integrated security forces after conflict’, African Security 12 (2008), 
pp. 69–91; Roy Licklider (ed.), New Armies from Old: Merging competing military forces after civil 
wars (Georgetown University Press,Washington, DC, 2014). 7	With the exception of Burundi, where a remaining rebel group integrated at a later stage. See 
International Crisis Group, ‘Burundi: réussir l’intégration des FNL’ (Africa Briefing No. 63, 
International Crisis Group, Nairobi and Brussels, 30 July 2009).	
 
The mixed results of initial military merging (2003–ca 2007) 
 
The Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed 
Forces of the DRC) was created in 2003, in the wake of a negotiated settlement that 
stipulated the merging of the fighting forces of all belligerents of the Second Congo 
War (1998– 2002) into a new national army.8 The negotiation and execution of the 
military power-sharing part of the 2002 Pretoria agreement was one of the most 
contentious and difficult issues of the DRC’ s peace process. It took place in an 
atmosphere of profound distrust and disagreements. As violence in the east continued, 
the commitments made by those at the negotiation table in Kinshasa were often short 
on credibility. Furthermore, the process was highly opaque, given that factions 
withheld crucial information with regard to arms caches and numbers of combatants. 
This tense climate turned the allocation of ranks, command, and staff positions into 
particularly disputed issues. In general, a generous ranks policy was applied, resulting 
in a disproportionate number of officers in relation to soldiers, and a general deflation 
of ranks, which fed frictions within the army.9 Even more contentious than the issue 
of ranks was the distribution of command and staff positions. Whereas the allocation 
of the most senior positions, specifically in the national and regional command 
structures, was based on a quota system that reflected declared troop numbers, the 
nomination of individual candidates and the distribution of non-senior positions did 
not follow transparent criteria.10 Predictably, this caused in-fighting and tension, 
especially since the stakes were very high. With official salaries being negligible, it is 
a position, often coupled to a specific position in a Big Man network, and not a rank, 
which determines one’ s fortune(s) and influence in the FARDC.11  Hence, the 
struggle for positions was a deeply political process, the outcomes of which 
were shaped by power games played at several levels. As a consequence, factions 
with little clout and lacking connections in Kinshasa lost out. These were mostly 
smaller factions with only a local power base, like the Mai Mai, a heterogeneous 
collection of rural-based militia. Realizing they would lose power and resources when 
leaving their local fiefs, many such groups had little appetite for becoming absorbed 
in the FARDC. For others who did integrate, frustration about being marginalized 
would later form part of their motivation to desert. 
The mixing of troops led to further complications. It was to be achieved 
through a so-called brassage (brewing) process, which consisted of mixing fighters 
on an individual basis and then retraining them in integrated brigades. This process 
was supposed to break down former command structures and old loyalties, thus 
establishing a unified chain of command. Officially, brassage aimed for a 
geographical spread and balanced composition of the integrated brigades. However, 
these principles were not consistently adhered to and have (as we will demonstrate 
below) continued to be flouted in subsequent phases of integration. One of the factors 																																																								8	The troop-contributing signatories, aside from the government, were the following: MLC, RCD-G, 
RCD-ML, RCD-N, and the various groups of Mai Mai. However, non-signatories of the final accord, 
including the plethora of armed groups in the Ituri district, were also allowed to integrate their troops. 9	Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, ‘Making sense of violence: voices of soldiers in the Congo 
(DRC)’, Journal of Modern African Studies 46, 1 (2008), pp. 57–86. 10	Judith Verweijen, ‘Half-brewed: the lukewarm results of creating an integrated Congolese military’, 
in Licklider (ed.), New Armies from Old. 11	For a recent analysis of Big Man networks in African (post-)conflict societies see Mats Utas (ed.), 
African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and networks (Zed Books, London and New York, 
NY, 2012). 
contributing to this was the manipulation of the military integration process by the 
different troop-contributing factions.12  
The military forces to be integrated were generally part of wider political-
economic networks that had developed in the course of the wars. Reluctant to give up 
control over their spheres of influence and their constituencies, several factions 
sabotaged the brassage process, especially in the east. They either withheld their 
troops, or tried to manipulate the process, by preventing their integrated troops from 
being deployed far from their zones of influence or by refusing their placement under 
a different command chain. As a result, military integration proceeded only at a snail’ 
s pace.13 Whereas new command structures had been created in 2003, the last 
integrated brigade (the 18th) was only formed in 2008. Despite these setbacks, the 
brigades resulting from brassage were reasonably well integrated, as former 
affiliations gradually diminished in importance.14  However, this did not apply to the 
national and regional command structures. In addition, the problem of units refusing 
integration remained. 
One of the groups dodging brassage was a part of the biggest rebel faction, the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-G, Congolese Rally for 
Democracy-Goma), who had controlled most of the Kivus. Its leadership was 
dominated by Congolese Tutsis and Hutus, also called ‘Rwandophones’.15  The RCD-
G faced bleak prospects in the 2006 general elections that were to end the ‘ transition 
period’.16 Their wartime behaviour and image as a vehicle for Rwandan interests had 
made them unpopular. Furthermore, they feared for the security of the Tutsi 
community in the Kivus, a fear that was instrumentalized in order to justify their 
refusal to send all of their troops to brassage. At the same time, the RCD’ s power 
base, including its sources of revenue, enjoyed relative autonomy from Kinshasa, in 
part due to its strong connections to Rwanda. Consequently, parts of this group sensed 
they had little to gain from integration into the FARDC.17  It is from this group that 
the CNDP, and later, parts of M23 would issue, in both cases driven by a desire to 
hold on to local fiefdoms and separate spheres of power. 
 
Revolving doors in a military mess (ca 2007–9) 
 
As a result of the slow pace and manipulation of the integration process, the eastern 
DRC still swarmed with forces that were not effectively integrated after the 
‘transition’ ended in 2006. Additionally, foreign armed forces like the Forces 																																																								12	Stephanie Wolters and Henri Boshoff, ‘The impact of slow military reform on the transition process 
in the DRC’ (Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 10 July 2006). 13	Hans Hoebeke, Henri Boshoff, and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Assessing security sector reform and its 
impact on the Kivu provinces’ (Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 26 November 
2008). 14	Judith Verweijen, The Ambiguity of Militarization: The complex interaction between the Congolese 
armed forces and civilians in the Kivu provinces, eastern DRC (unpublished PhD dissertation, Utrecht 
University, forthcoming). 15		‘Rwandophone’ refers originally to Kinyarwanda speakers, encompassing Hutus and Tutsis, but has 
come to signify a more comprehensive ethnicized identity in the DRC. 16	Transition is put between quotation marks, as this period did not really lead to a transformation of 
governance, and therefore does not qualify as a ‘transition’. See Timothy Raeymaekers, The Power of 
Protection: Governance and transborder trade on the Congo–Ugandan frontier (unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Ghent University, 2007), p. 31. 17	Jason Stearns, ‘Laurent Nkunda and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP)’, 
in Stefaan Marysse, Filip Reyntjens, and Stef Vandegiste (eds), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 
2007–2008 (L’Harmattan, Paris, 2008), pp. 245–67. 
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Liberation Forces of 
Rwanda),18 a former proxy of the Kinshasa government, occupied vast swathes of the 
Kivus. It also became increasingly clear that many brassage dodgers preferred to opt 
out on a permanent basis, and were reorganizing themselves as armed groups. This 
applied both to smaller Mai-Mai groups, and to a part of the RCD-G. 
In 2006, a Tutsi-led dissident faction of the RCD-G formally established 
themselves as a rebel group called CNDP under General Laurent Nkunda.This group 
swiftly became one of the most powerful armed groups in the DRC in military, 
political, and economic terms, partly as a result of Rwandan support. After a series of 
resounding military defeats for the government, a first attempt to integrate the CNDP 
into the FARDC was embarked upon in early 2007. This occurred through a process 
called mixage, which allowed CNDP troops to stay in or close to their stronghold in 
Masisi (North Kivu), while breaking integrated units down only to the battalion level. 
This set-up meant that mixage and the efforts to neutralize Nkunda were doomed from 
the beginning. It allowed him to maintain established command structures, while 
expanding his power and sources of income. Moreover, his brigades were operating 
autonomously from the 8th Military Region (North Kivu) and were conducting 
military operations not controlled by the hierarchy.19 After a couple of months, it 
became painfully clear that the ‘integration’ had failed. With the mixed brigades 
disintegrating, the situation deteriorated, and a year of off- and- on fighting followed. 
Meanwhile, smaller-scale armed groups also continued to proliferate. Most of 
these consisted of army deserters or demobilized fighters who were dissatisfied with 
their new positions in the post-settlement order. Many had lost influence and income 
in comparison to the war era. Others felt that they were discriminated against by the 
Kinshasa government, which they perceived to favour Rwandophones.20  Some also 
had little trust that the FARDC would protect their communities, as they saw the army 
as partisan. Given that much of the economy and the administration in the east 
remained strongly influenced by militarized networks, violence and armed group 
creation continued to be a viable way to build a power position. Furthermore, military 
pressure on armed groups was low. Counter-insurgency operations did not seem to be 
the priority of the newly elected government, nor did it dispose of a sufficiently 
capable or motivated army to undertake these in an effective manner. Rather, 
Kinshasa preferred to continue to negotiate with dissident groups, following the time-
tested approach of cooption. Consequently, armed groups, including those founded by 
army deserters, were enticed with promises of ranks, positions, and other privileges, 
such as control over their former strongholds. 
As we show in subsequent sections, this policy of ‘ many carrots with few 
sticks’ made the (re)constitution of armed groups a rewarding business, causing some 
factions to move in and out of the army opportunistically. This revolving-door 
mechanism was also triggered by the Goma Peace Conference. At the start of 2008, 																																																								18	The FDLR are a rebel group run by Hutu elements of the former Rwandan government army and 
Interahamwe militia who fled to the DRC after the 1994 genocide. 19	For more details on the mixage process, see Stearns, ‘Laurent Nkunda’, and Stephanie Wolters, 
‘Trouble in eastern DRC: the Nkunda factor’ (Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 
3 September 2007). 20	This is clearly illustrated by the political propaganda relayed by these groups at the 2008 Goma 
Conference. See for example, Joseph Assanda Mwenebatu, ‘Déclaration des Mai Mai de Fizi à la 
Conférence Nationale sur la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement dans les Provinces du Nord-Kivu et 
Sud-Kivu tenue à Goma en Janvier 2008’ (unpublished document, 10 January 2008). 	
the government tried to address the situation in the Kivus by arranging a grand peace 
conference in Goma. Sponsored by several international donors, the conference lasted 
over two weeks and included the CNDP as well as 21 other armed groups. However, 
shortly after an accord was signed, various armed groups and the DRC government 
mutually accused each other of violating its terms. The shaky ceasefire rapidly 
unravelled and the Kivus plunged into full-fledged violence again. 
 
Accelerated integration and accelerated desertion (2009–12) 
 
After the DRC government suffered a new series of military humiliations at the hands 
of the CNDP at the end of 2008, a new round of negotiations followed, again behind 
heavily closed doors. These talks came in the wake of a sudden rapprochement 
between Kinshasa and Kigali, and therefore featured strong Rwandan involvement. At 
the beginning of January 2009 General Bosco Ntaganda, chief of staff of the CNDP, 
announced that he had replaced Nkunda and that the CNDP would integrate into the 
FARDC. As during the 2007 mixage experiment, a fast-track military integration 
process was initiated without vetting or training, and without ensuring a balanced 
geographical deployment of integrated elements, who were broken down to company-
level only. Eventually, around 6,000 troops of the CNDP and a few thousand troops 
of the Hutu-led Coalition des Patriotes Résistants Congolais (PARECO, Alliance of 
Resistant Congolese Patriots), plus a number of smaller armed groups, were 
integrated.21 
Since the government negotiated from a position of weakness, the price to buy 
CNDP ‘loyalty’ was high. Thus, the CNDP was awarded an impressive number of 
important command positions within newly created operational structures. They also 
obtained privileged access to lucrative areas of deployment, like those rich in natural 
resources, important trade routes, and border crossings. This enabled them to extend 
their influence far beyond the areas they controlled before integration. Furthermore, 
they were allowed to keep their arms caches and maintain (initially) parallel systems 
of taxation and administration in their fief of Central Masisi. Finally, the bulk of their 
forces could remain deployed in the Kivu provinces, leading them to build up a 
position of military dominance.22 As we demonstrate further below, the privileged 
treatment of the ex-CNDP created a deep-seated frustration among the other troops. It 
triggered renewed desertions, specifically from ex-Mai Mai, while also reinforcing 
the mobilization of non-integrated groups. 
In brief, CNDP integration intensified power struggles within the military, 
within the Kivus, between the Kinshasa government and the Kivus, and, eventually, 
between Kinshasa and Kigali. As the ex-CNDP continued to exist as a parallel and 
influential structure within the FARDC, their integration became conditional upon 
their ongoing access to pay-offs. The subsequent situation represented a Catch-22, as 
reducing the ex-CNDP’s influence within the FARDC would imply wresting control 
over their autonomous sources of revenue. Yet, it was precisely this autonomous 
economic base that enabled them to withstand government pressure. Essentially, 
therefore, the latter was held hostage.  																																																								21	Jason Stearns, ‘North Kivu: the background to conflict in North Kivu province of eastern Congo’ 
(Usalama Project, Rift Valley Institute, London, 2012), pp. 40–1. 22	‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (UN Security 
Council, S/2009/206, New York, 23 November 2009), pp. 45–57; ‘Final Report of the Group of 
Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (UN Security Council, S/2010/596, New York, 29 
November 2010), pp. 42–6. 
This uncomfortable position became painfully clear when the presidential 
circle tried to dilute the ex-CNDP’s power in the Kivus from the end of 2010 
onwards. The first attempt to do so consisted of pronouncing a temporary ban on 
mining activities, which aimed to loosen the grip military actors held over the sector. 
During this time they also pushed for the redeployment of a part of the ex-CNDP’s 
troops elsewhere, with the FARDC chief of staff threatening to court-martial those 
refusing the orders. In 2011, yet another attempt was made to break parallel command 
chains, this time through a restructuring process that transformed brigades into 
regiments. However, none of these measures were effective: the mining ban ended up 
reinforcing, rather than weakening, the grip of the FARDC over the sector; ex-CNDP 
officers simply refused redeployment – with impunity; and the regimentation process 
was hijacked, strengthening instead of diminishing the ex-CNDP’s influence on the 
FARDC command in the Kivus.23 
After his contentious re-election in 2011, President Joseph Kabila renewed 
efforts to dismantle the ex-CNDP power network in the Kivus, partly in a bid to boost 
his domestic and international popularity and restore a part of his dented legitimacy. 
This included plans to remove General Bosco Ntaganda, for whose arrest the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued a warrant in 2006. At the beginning of 
2012, a number of reform initiatives were announced, including redeployments and 
changes in command. This new threat to their power position provoked a strong 
reaction among sections of the ex-CNDP, who mutinied, deserted, and subsequently 
founded the M23. The mutiny was facilitated by the parallel systems of command, 
revenues, and armaments the CNDP had maintained within the FARDC.24 
Furthermore, it is plausible that the relative ease with which army deserters can 
integrate back into the FARDC, and from a better bargaining position, played a role in 
their decision to desert. Hence, the creation of the M23 fits into a wider pattern of 
revolving-door military integration that has been fed by a many-carrots-with-few-
sticks approach. 
Below we analyse the implications of these processes for conflict dynamics, 
focusing on three aspects: the effects on armed-group mobilization, the impact on 
conflicts between and within communities in the east, and, finally, the consequences 
for the armed forces in terms of cohesion and operational effectiveness.  
 
The creation of incentive structures promoting insurgent violence 
 
A key to understanding the impact of military integration on conflict dynamics in the 
eastern DRC is that it has been an ongoing process, with (parts of) factions alternately 
integrating and deserting. In combination with the many-carrots-with-few-sticks 
approach, this has had a profound impact on the cost–benefit calculations made by 
military entrepreneurs. On the one hand, it has lowered the costs of military 
integration drastically. Given that armed groups are allowed to integrate without 
handing in all their arms caches and fighters, while staying in or close to their fiefs, 
and while maintaining their combatants under their own command, the costs 
associated with military integration are low. Furthermore, the policy is easy to 
reverse, as desertion does not spoil the forecasts for reintegration, nor is it punished 																																																								23	‘Final report’, S/2010/596, pp. 45–6; ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ (UN Security Council, S/2011/738, New York, 2 December 2011), pp. 81–3. 24	‘Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (UN Security 
Council, S/2012/348, New York, 21 June 2012), pp. 18–30. 	
individually or through serious military pressure on groups who dropped out. On the 
other hand, the potential benefits of military integration continue to be significant. 
These include the generous distribution of (promises of) high ranks and important 
positions, and military and sometimes de facto administrative control over fiefdoms 
or lucrative zones. 
As demonstrated above, the many-carrots-with-few-sticks-approach was built 
into military integration from the beginning. However, the balance between costs and 
benefits became even more skewed in subsequent military integration processes. 
Serial military integration gave military entrepreneurs further opportunities and 
incentives to turn (threats of) desertion, non-integration, or violence into a political 
resource, thus reinforcing their negotiation position. This ‘ rents of violence 
syndrome’25 was made extremely clear by the 2008 Goma Conference. In addition to 
giving military and political entrepreneurs an opportunity to voice their demands, get 
international attention and legitimacy, and profit from generous per diems and other 
benefits packages, this conference raised hopes of access to desirable positions in the 
administration and military. These (potential) benefits were so enticing that dormant 
armed groups, like Mudundu 40, were promptly revived and new ones created.26 In 
many cases, the initiative for renewed mobilization was taken by commanders who 
had failed to obtain favourable positions during brassage. 
Commander Mahoro is a case in point. He occupied a high position in the 
Mai-Mai brigade of Nyakiliba in South Kivu during the Second War, but received 
only the rank of major and a negligible position after brassage. When he learned of 
the Goma Conference, he decided to launch his own movement: the Mai-Mai 
Mahoro. Profiting from the revenues of the conference, he, like many other groups, 
intensified recruitment, in order to inflate their numbers before integration. In this 
way, he hoped to obtain higher ranks and better positions. In Mahoro’s case, this 
strategy worked with regards to rank, and he was made full colonel after his 2009 
integration into the FARDC. However, failing again to obtain an influential position, 
he resumed armed group activity. In May 2011, he deserted and joined the Mai-Mai 
Mushombe in the hills of Uvira territory (South Kivu). His main motivation for this, 
as he declared, was to obtain a better function in the FARDC and have his rank as full 
colonel officially recognized.27 
In sum, the pursued approach to military integration has profoundly skewed 
the balance between the costs and benefits of army integration, turning it into a 
political resource for military entrepreneurs and the wider political-economic 
networks in which they are embedded. Of specific importance in this respect has been 
the lack of credible guarantees to sanction defectors, often highlighted in the literature 
on civil war settlements as one of the main obstacles to implementation.28A telling 
example here is that of Lt Col Kifaru, an ex-PARECO commander who deserted with 
around 200 troops from the regimentation centre of Kananda (Fizi, South Kivu) in 
June 2011. What pushed him to desert was that he knew he would not be given the 
position of regiment commander, having demonstrated his inability to run the 43rd 
sector in Fizi. Frustrated and incensed, Kifaru and his troops fled into the mountains, 																																																								25	Tull and Mehler, ‘Hidden costs of power-sharing’, p. 391.	26	Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘Kivu’s intractable security conundrum’, African 
Affairs 108, 432 (2009), pp. 475–84. 27	Interview, Mai Mai commander Mahoro Kitay Ngombarufu, Bijombo-Ishenge, 18 November 2011. 28	Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace: The durable settlement of civil wars (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009), p. 2. 	
committing considerable human rights violations on the way. However, under 
pressure from ex-CNDP circles, investigations into the committed abuses were halted 
and Kifaru was reintegrated into the FARDC, without any form of sanction. By 
contrast, and to the astonishment of many, he was made commander of the 111th 
regiment. Hence, he was essentially rewarded for his desertion, regardless of the 
human rights abuses committed by his troops.  
Many in the military who had previously served in Kifaru’ s sector ascribed 
this impunity to his ‘Rwandophone’ background. In the words of one lieutenant: ‘ A 
Rwandophone can kill, assassinate, rape, and do whatever he wants. But if it were me, 
a Congolese, Moreno Ocampo [Prosecutor of the ICC] would be informed the same 
day.’29  This interpretation was widely shared by civilians in this area, reflecting 
another effect of the military integration route taken, namely the fuelling of prevailing 
inter-and intra-community conflicts. 
 
The fuelling of inter-and intra-community conflicts 
 
The unbalanced composition of the brigades created after the 2009 fast-track 
integration, and their deficient geographical distribution, came to fuel existing inter-
and intra-community tensions in the Kivus.30  Some of these brigades consisted of a 
majority of ex-CNDP or ex-PARECO troops, leading to a domination by 
‘Rwandophones’. In areas largely populated by self-styled ‘autochthonous’  
populations, who have come to be defined antagonistically towards ‘Rwandophones’, 
this allowed local ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize support by brandishing hostile 
rhetoric.31  One manifestation of this was the revival of the ‘infiltration’ hypothesis, 
leading to a recycling of the old joke of calling the FARDC ‘Forces Armées 
Rwandaises en RDC’  (Rwandan Armed Forces in the DRC). Moreover, 
‘Rwandophone’ soldiers were increasingly portrayed as pawns of Rwandan interests 
or simply as Rwandan nationals, a vanguard for the occupation and dismemberment 
of the Congo seeking to expel populations from their land and grab their natural 
resources. In various places in the Kivus, Mai-Mai groups capitalized upon CNDP 
integration by inflating the security threats it entailed. For example, in a 2011 political 
manifesto, the Fizi-based Mai Mai Yakutumba listed as ‘recommendations’ that ‘ the 
foreign troops camouflaged as FARDC (CNDP, FDLR) go back to their country of 
origins’, as each entry of foreign troops is ‘a provocation and a threat of war’.32 Thus, 
the perceived lack of neutrality of the army exacerbated locally experienced security 
dilemmas, with ethnic entrepreneurs harnessing military integration policies for their 
own agendas. 
However, the ways in which military integration has reinforced inter-and 
intra-community tensions must also be ascribed to the military’s tendency to be drawn 
into dispute settlement and other local governance issues. Military integration without 
redeployment of troops has allowed many units to stay close to their constituencies 																																																								29	Interview, FARDC lieutenant, Luberizi, 7 November 2011.	30	International Crisis Group, ‘Congo: no stability in Kivu despite a rapprochement with Rwanda’ 
(Africa Report No. 165, International Crisis Group, Nairobi and Brussels, 16 November 2010). 31	For more details on the autochthony discourse, see Stephen Jackson, ‘Sons of which soil? The 
language and politics of autochthony in eastern DRCongo’, African Studies Review 49, 2 (2006), pp. 
95–123. 32	Mai Mai Reformé, Groupe Alleluia/Yakotumba, ‘Notre cahier de charge adressée à son excellence 
monsieur le Président de la République et Chef de l’Etat de la République Démocratique du Congo à 
Kinshasa’ (unpublished document, 5 February 2011). 
and established political-economic networks. In the face of weak civilian governance, 
this increases the likelihood of military interference in civilian affairs, especially 
dispute resolution.33 This is particularly evident in relation to conflicts about property 
rights, political influence, and land or other natural resources,34 but also in disputes 
concerning private and family affairs.35  While both locally recruited troops and those 
coming from elsewhere engage in such forms of public and private regulation, our 
research shows that the involvement of the first is more likely to exacerbate tensions, 
given the specific links they have to certain communities and established elites. This 
illustrates the destabilizing effects of military integration without redeployment and 
with an unbalanced mix of troops. As discussed below, this approach has also had a 
detrimental impact on dynamics within the military.  
 
The further unmaking of an unmade army 
 
The roots of the FARDC’ s notorious combat weakness go far beyond processes of 
military integration. This phenomenon must be considered in the light of both the 
country’ s military history, and the nature of its state apparatus. Being an integral part 
of the Congolese state, the FARDC reflects all the particularities, which some would 
call dysfunctions, of its administration. In the military realm, the weak 
institutionalization of the state in rational-legal terms translates into irregular and non-
centralized command chains and inefficient systems of logistics, communications, and 
intelligence. These features were also found among the FARDC’ s predecessor forces, 
creating a long tradition of erratic military functioning.36 Moreover, and similar to 
work in the administration,37 service in the FARDC is characterized by a relative lack 
of material (salaries) and non-material (social status, recognition) rewards,38 which 
has lowered soldiers’ enthusiasm for risking their lives in combat. In combination 
with the workings of Big Man logics, which render power projection dependent on 
the distribution of (access to) resources, these low official rewards foster a constant 
need for revenue generation. As a consequence, the FARDC is simply not geared 
towards reaching operational effectiveness. 
Whereas the roots of irregular military functioning are multiple and deep, 
rebel integration processes have contributed to the further unmaking of an already 
unmade army. The lack of retraining and redeployment has nurtured parallel 
structures of command, thus undermining centralized command and control. While 
brassage managed to break down some of the old allegiances, the fast-track 
integration of 2009 fostered a continuation of strong separate patronage networks and 																																																								33	Verweijen, Ambiguity of Militarization.	34	See for instance, Nicholas Garrett, Sylvia Sergiou, and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Negotiated peace for 
extortion: the case of Walikale territory in eastern DR Congo’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, 1 
(2009), pp. 1–21. For examples of the role played by ex-CNDP officers in land conflicts in Masisi, see 
‘Final report’, S/2010/596, pp. 73–4. 35	Judith Verweijen, ‘Military business and the business of the military in the Kivus’, Review of African 
Political Economy 40, 135 (2013), pp. 67–82. 36	Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 1985), pp. 248–75. 37	Theodore Trefon, ‘Public service provision in a failed state: looking beyond predation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, Review of African Political Economy 36, 119 (2009), pp. 9–21. 38	For more details on the social conditions within the FARDC and their consequences, see Maria 
Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, ‘The complexity of violence: a critical analysis of sexual violence in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’ (Sida Working Paper on gender-based violence, Sida, 
Stockholm, 2010). 
command chains.39 As one officer put it: ‘at present, there are carrots, onions, 
potatoes; the FARDC is a true bouillabaisse’.40 This has contributed to what is called 
in military-sociological terminology ‘low social and task cohesion’, which are crucial 
for combat motivation and performance.41 
  While these parallel power networks by no means simply follow ethnic 
identification, the 2009 integration of the CNDP reinforced the 
‘autochthon/Rwandophone’ cleavage within the military.42  In fact, it fuelled 
antagonism up to the point that some soldiers came to speak of a ‘Cold War’ within 
the military. Clearly, these divisions further undermine cohesion and promote 
subordination, as troops are less willing to obey orders from superiors they suspect 
will only defend the parochial interest of their own community. Furthermore, the 
failure to break down old allegiances has been manifested in the repeated leaking of 
military intelligence.43 Integrated forces, which are often closely connected to non-
integrated remnants, have tended to be generous with the diffusion of military 
information. These divided loyalties have further demoralized troops, who are often 
painfully aware that they are fighting an enemy often warned of a forthcoming attack. 
Importantly, this demoralization has been markedly intensified by the many-
carrots-with-few-sticks approach, which has created feelings of unpredictability and 
unfairness within the ranks of the FARDC. This has serious implications for combat 
motivation. While desertion is considered the gravest form of indiscipline in other 
armies, the Congolese authorities, as demonstrated above, have regularly welcomed 
defected units and commanders back into the fold, often even rewarding them with 
better opportunities. Logically, the propensity to excel in fighting sharply diminishes 
when there is a real chance that today’ s enemy is tomorrow’ s commander. As one 
captain explained: 
If I am sent back again [to the ‘front’]? Then I will desert. I will not go. Why should I risk 
my life? What do I get? Nothing. No salary, no ration, no nothing. Also, the people you 
fight today, tomorrow the superiors tell you they are integrated – that they are your 
colleagues. And you find some loser with no training becoming your commanding officer. But 
we– we get nothing. You fought – but in the end you turn out to be the loser/idiot [yo muntu 
obimi nyuma].44 
  
In short, by further unmaking an already unmade FARDC, military integration has 
generated a vicious circle. Having an army that is unable and unwilling to defeat or 
even deter, has encouraged the DRC government to coopt armed groups through 
generous offers. This again, has undermined the military’ s operational effectiveness, 
and occasioned the proliferation of armed groups. The (re)integration of these groups, 
in turn, has further weakened the military. In this way, flawed and serial military 
integration has fuelled, rather than defused, the militarization of the Kivus. 																																																								39	This confirms findings by Gaub that mixing units at lower levels will result in higher cohesion. See 
Florence Gaub, Military Integration after Civil Wars: Multi-ethnic armies, identity, and post-conflict 
reconstruction (Routledge, London and New York, NY, 2011) 40	Interview, FARDC Major, Lemera, 19 March 2010.	41	See, for example, Leonard Wong, ‘Combat motivation in today’s soldiers’, Armed Forces & Society 
32, 2 (2006), pp. 659–63; Robert. J. MacCoun, Elizabeth Kier, and Aaron Belkin, ‘Does social 
cohesion determine motivation in combat? An old question with an old answer’, Armed Forces & 
Society 32, 2 (2006), pp. 646–54. 42	Final report’, S/2011/738, pp. 89–90.	43	While leaks of intelligence are also common among other troops, being both a business in itself and 
facilitating business, our field research indicates that the threshold for defusing information is lower 
among weakly integrated troops.  44	Interview, FARDC captain, Kinshasa, April 2009.	
 
Understanding the politics of military integration 
 
Why then have these harmful policies and processes been allowed to continue for so 
long? Why did the Kabila government hold on to the messy policy of ongoing 
military integration and endless negotiations with ever-proliferating armed groups? 
The dominant interpretation, widely circulating among external actors involved in 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the DRC, is that the government lacks ‘political 
will’ to engage in real army reform and stabilize the east.45  According to this logic, 
failed military integration– like slow progress with SSR generally – is a result of the 
government cunningly masquerading as genuinely committed to reform, while 
consciously sabotaging it.46  The purported reasons provided in this line of argument 
are that a strong army could destabilize the regime and that key actors in government 
circles profit from a continuation of (low-intensity) conflict in the eastern provinces. 
Certainly, lukewarm government commitment is a part of the problem. The 
divide-and-rule policy towards the army has a long tradition in the Congo,47 as in 
other places where a coherent army has been judged undesirable.48 Moreover, it is 
clear that key actors within the military and political establishment in Kinshasa 
benefit from the profits reaped by military entrepreneurs in the east.49  It is reasonable 
to assume that this contributes to a lukewarm commitment to army institutionalization 
and stability. However, in addition to being based on a simplistic notion of ‘ political 
will’ as either existing or not, as if it was a binary rather than a continuum, assuming 
that failed military integration is simply a result of Kabila’ s efforts to harvest the 
fruits of continued disorder is to obscure a range of important factors. 
First, such assumptions ignore the difficulties posed by projecting central state 
power in a strongly fragmented political-military environment, without a tradition of 
direct administrative intervention. Historically, Kinshasa has exercised power over the 
Kivus through intermediaries and the cooption and integration into Big Man networks 
of local power holders. This has always been an ‘archipelago-like rule’, in which 
more direct administrative intervention was limited to strategic and resource-rich 
areas.50 Hence, if placed in a historical perspective, military integration policies can 
be seen to reflect a continuation of a time-tested strategy of patronage-based indirect 
rule.  																																																								45	See, for example, Henri Boshoff, Dylan Hendrickson, Sylvie More, and Thierry Vircoulon, 
‘Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a rock and a hard place. An analysis of the donor approach to 
supporting security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, 2010); ASADHO et al., ‘The Democratic Republic of 
Congo: taking a stand on security sector reform’ (ASADHO et al., New York, NY, 16 April 2012). 46	See Theodore Trefon, Congo Masquerade: The political culture of aid inefficiency and reform 
failure (Zed Books, London and New York, NY, 2010). For a critical discussion, featuring Congolese 
voices, see Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, ‘Willing reform? An analysis of defence reform 
initiatives in the DRC’, in Arne Bigsten (ed.), Globalization and Development: Rethinking 
interventions and governance (Routledge, New York, NY, forthcoming 2013). 47	Jacques Ebenga and Thierry N’Landu, ‘The Congolese National Army: in search of an identity’, in 
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Boulder, CO, 2001). 49	For example, the involvement of FARDC Chief of Staff Gabriel Amisi in mining operations in the 
Kivus has been well documented. See ‘Final Report’, S/2011/738, pp. 62, 116, 120, 129–30. 50	Denis Tull, ‘A reconfiguration of political order: the state of the state in North Kivu (DR Congo)’, 
African Affairs 102, 408 (2003), pp. 429–46. 
Second and relatedly, the nature of the army renders elusive the 
straightforward implementation of any military policy – even when desired by 
Kinshasa. An important channel of access to state resources, economic influence, and 
political power, the FARDC is a collection of permanently competing power 
networks that is subject to strong centrifugal tendencies. The constant balancing act 
that is required for maintaining this army intact sharply reduces Kinshasa’ s room for 
manoeuvre. In order to maintain a dominant position, the presidential circle has opted 
for divide-and-rule techniques and frequent rotations of office. Ongoing rebel– 
military integration strongly promotes the power fluctuations needed for these 
strategies.51 From this angle, military integration can be seen as part of a strategy not 
to destabilize, but rather to retain a measure of control within the FARDC – although 
this has worked only to a limited extent. 
Third, military realities have sharply reduced the government’ s options to 
defeat armed groups. This is not only related to the combat weakness of the FARDC 
elaborated on above, or its collusion with rebel groups. The difficult terrain of eastern 
DRC seriously limits the effectiveness of military operations. Rebels can easily 
withdraw into the vast swathes of isolated, infrastructure-less dense forest and hills 
that cover much of the east. Counter-insurgency efforts across the globe have amply 
demonstrated the pitfalls of such combat theatres, even when disposing over vast and 
state-of-the-art military resources.52  In this light, it is perhaps understandable that 
military decision makers have continued to prefer cooption and to rely occasionally 
on proxies with much more situational awareness. Certainly, that strategy has further 
added to the volatility of the military situation. 
Fourth, the dominant discourse of a lack of ‘ political will’ focuses on the 
supposed benefits of continuing conflict and tends to neglect the latter’ s political 
costs for the government. As demonstrated in the 2011 elections, the unpopular 
strategy of CNDP integration and ongoing violence led to a sharp fall in electoral 
support for Kabila in the east.53  As highlighted above, Kabila was also pushed to act 
against CNDP dominance by diminished domestic and international legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the strong position of the CNDP in the Kivus posed a threat to the 
formal and informal interests of the presidential patronage network. For these reasons, 
it is not likely that Kinshasa struck an integration deal with the CNDP merely to let 
them entrench their power position. Rather, as indicated by Jason Stearns, this policy 
reflected a longer-term strategy to gradually dismantle CNDP power, hoping that the 
splits within the CNDP caused by the ousting of Nkunda would facilitate the 
process.54  We have already described some of the actions that form part of this 
strategy – such as the 2010 mining ban, orders of redeployment, and the 
regimentation process. Certainly, Rwanda’ s diverse interests in the Kivus have 
hampered the implementation of this strategy. Beyond shaping the modalities of 
CNDP integration, support from elements in Kigali also facilitated the M23 rebellion, 																																																								51	Verweijen, Ambiguity of Militarization. 52	See Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The guerilla in history, Vol. 2 (iUniverse, Bloomington, 
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change in the DRC’, Journal of Democracy 18, 2 (2007), pp. 138–51, p. 148. Data for 2011 from the 
National Independent Electoral Commission of the DRC, 2011, 
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Valley Institute, Usalama Project, 2012). 
and has been instrumental in its military advances, including the taking of Goma in 
November 2012.55 Yet, as Stearns points out, the CNDP ‘ was never a Rwandan 
puppet’56 and CNDP officers have had rather uncomfortable and distrustful relations 
with Rwanda. Hence, Rwandan involvement is just one part of the story of CNDP 
(dis)integration and its partial rebirth in the M23. Rather than being an ‘ armed group 
apart’ operating only through regionally determined logics, the CNDP’s trajectory 
also strongly reflects the impacts of Big Man politics and military integration policies 
as shaped by the DRC government. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the somewhat nebulous ‘ lack of political 
will’ argument tends to obscure the shared responsibility of international donors. The 
latter have largely supported the DRC’ s bumpy road of military integration, with the 
MONUSCO, for example, carrying out joint military operations with newly integrated 
troops who were not retrained and not redeployed. Donor countries providing bilateral 
military assistance also did little to exert influence on integration processes in the 
east. For example, they could have pushed for a certain quota of newly integrated 
troops in the units they were training, or made continued support depended on the 
redeployment of troops out of the Kivus. However, driven largely by a desire to 
enhance their own visibility, external actors have directed their efforts to easy 
interventions with clear measurable output, such as various forms of training. 
Furthermore, they have focused on short-term and quantifiable indicators of ‘ 
stabilization’ – like numbers of integrated rebel soldiers – while closing their eyes to 





This article demonstrates the detrimental effects of the erratic military integration 
process embarked upon in the DRC. By creating incentives for insurgent violence, 
aggravating inter-and intra-community conflicts, and further unmaking an already 
unmade army, it has fostered the proliferation of armed groups. Our analysis 
highlights what Dennis Tull and Andreas Mehler have called the ‘demonstration 
effects’ of power-sharing agreements.57 It shows how military power sharing was 
turned into a bargaining chip for military entrepreneurs, and how this motivated 
dissatisfied and marginalized (former) officers to create new armed groups. 
However, we are not suggesting that these effects were produced through the 
mere integration of rebel groups into the army. Rather, our conclusion is that the 
problems with the DRC’ s military integration trajectory are to a large extent located 
in the way integration policies were shaped and played out on the ground. Of 
particular importance in this respect has been the many-carrots-with-few-sticks 
approach, epitomized by the overly generous treatment of integrated troops and a lack 
of punishment for defectors. The main elements of this approach included: serial 
integration without the threat that the door to the army would ever be closed, a lack of 
retraining and redeployment of integrated troops, a mild approach to parallel power 
structures and command chains, and, finally, an unbalanced composition of units 
which undermined belief in the military’s neutrality. Our analysis therefore supports 																																																								55	‘Letter dated 26 November 2012 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the DRC 
addressed to the Chairman’ (Security Council Committee, S/AC.43/20 12/NOTE.64, New York, 27 
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the conclusion reached by Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis that while 
military integration does not appear to be an effective peace-building tool, the 
problems are located to a large extent in the structure and implementation of military 
power-sharing agreements, rather than in the principle of military power sharing 
itself.58 However, we also concur with René Lemarchand that it is not only in the 
technicalities and modes of implementation of power sharing that explanations for its 
outcomes must be sought: the socio-political context, including geopolitics, plays a 
crucial role too.59  In the case of the DRC, the task at hand was severely complicated 
by the fragmented political-military environment, the strong trans-border orientation 
and local rootedness of some of the factions, the low degree of institutionalization of 
the state, and, finally, the backdrop of ongoing inter- and intra-community conflicts in 
the east. Regardless of the design of power-sharing deals, their implementation in 
such conditions is, as Lemarchand rightly points out, ‘a Sysiphean job’.60 In sum, both 
the mechanics of military power-sharing deals and the context in which they are 
implemented matter for their outcomes. More successful experiences with military 
integration elsewhere seem to corroborate this conclusion.61 
By emphasizing the ways in which military integration has fuelled conflict and 
the proliferation of armed groups, our research also calls for a greater recognition of 
the crucial agency of political-military entrepreneurs, as well as of how this agency is 
shaped by national-level policies. These insights are particularly useful for research 
efforts exploring ‘local violence and conflicts’.62 Often grounded in a reification of 
‘the local’, some of this research tends to downplay how strongly dynamics at supra-
local scales, including the agency of political-military entrepreneurs embedded in 
nationally and regionally operating networks, shape violence defined as ‘local’. As 
argued by Stathis Kalyvas, violence in internal conflicts is often the joint product of 
local and supra-local actors, with the latter providing crucial incentives to convert 
local conflicts into violence.63  It is important to recognize that political-military 
entrepreneurs like Mahoro, Yakutumba, or Ntaganda do not merely draw upon and ‘ 
voice’ existing grievances, but heavily contribute to their inflation, partly under the 
influence of incentives derived from national-level policies, including military 
integration. In brief, analysing the crucial agency of political-military entrepreneurs, 
and how their actions are shaped by supra-local factors, is essential for understanding 
conflict dynamics and violence that play out at the local level, but of which the causes 
and effects are not necessarily predominantly ‘local’. 
The central question now is how the DRC government and foreign donors will 
deal with the volatile legacy of flawed military integration policies. While the military 
integration route taken is just one factor in a wide array of processes producing 
insurgent mobilization and violence, it is clear that a failure to break the vicious circle 
resulting from these policies will encourage a further militarization of the east, as 
violence will continue to be convertible into political and military benefits. Moreover, 																																																								58	Glassmyer and Sambanis, ‘Rebel-military integration’.	59	René Lemarchand, ‘Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Affairs 106, 442 (2006), pp. 1–20. 60	Ibid., p. 20.	61	Licklider, New Armies from Old; Gaub, Military Integration.	62	See Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the failure of 
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such a failure will hamper further efforts to cook the bouillabaisse, and without more 
effective defence reform the longer-term prospects for the demilitarization of the 
eastern DRC will look even bleaker. 
